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Calls are increasing for manufacturers to provide evidence of
comparative efficacy of new drugs at the time of regulatory
approval.1 However, drug manufacturers maintain that doing
so would create unrealistically high barriers for market entry
and deter innovation. At a time of a perceived productivity crisis
in the drug industry, many claim that stricter market
authorisation regulation will be detrimental to the development
of new drugs.2 We review the historical effect of regulating
market authorisation and examine the benefits and risks of
raising evidence standards by requiring evidence of
non-inferiority for market entry.
What’s the hype?
Various components of drug development, including
experimentation, evidence generation, andmarketing are already
subject to regulation. However, there is interest in expanding
the remit of regulatory agencies in Europe and the United States
in order to make drug manufacturers more accountable and
market authorisation more stringent.3 Recent proposals include
making the raw data collected in pivotal randomised controlled
trials of new drugs publicly available and developing a
framework for independent appraisal of evidence.
One particularly important aspect is the standards of evidence
for marketing authorisation.4 Currently, each new product is
evaluated on its ownmerit, without being assessed against other
available treatments. As a result, many drugs are approved on
the basis of placebo controlled trials without showing their
equivalence, non-inferiority, or superiority to existing
alternatives. There are proposals in the United States and Europe
to require evidence on comparative efficacy at the time of
licensing.1 5 This is because the current regulatory environment
crowds the marketplace with products that offer marginal, if
any, improvements in therapeutic value over existing options.6 7
With an ever increasing number of seemingly similar drugs for
a given condition, prescribers do not have adequate evidence
on the comparative clinical effect and safety to determine the
best drug option.8
Yetmanufacturers have expressed concerns about being required
to provide comparative evidence at the time of marketing
authorisation. Some argue that existing experimental
designs—such as active-comparator trials—are expensive and
take a long time to complete.9Delays in launching new products
are also said to be costly, as companies lose exclusivity periods
and receive potentially lower returns to research and
development; this lowered profit expectation, in turn,
discourages future investment.10 Manufacturers maintain that
regulation requiring them to show that their products provide
added value would also discourage investment and hinder the
development of new drugs.11 In a recent survey, 64% of
respondents from these sectors stated that demonstrating that
their products have added value, whether clinical or economic,
is a major challenge.12
Regulatory environment
The market for pharmaceutical products is highly regulated
compared with that of other sectors, with regulators given the
power to restrict products from entering the market.
Manufacturers are prohibited frommarketing new drugs before
they are licensed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
in the United States or the EuropeanMedicines Agency (EMA)
in Europe.
The defining piece of legislation that has had a lasting effect on
the evidence standards for pharmaceutical market access in the
United States is the Kefauver-Harris DrugAmendments of 1962,
which mandated that manufacturers establish proof of efficacy
and safety through recognised “well-controlled studies.”13 These
amendments formally required manufacturers to establish rules
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of consent, good manufacturing practices, processes for
reporting adverse events, and accurate labelling of new products.
The amendments were partly a response to the thalidomide
controversy—when a drug marketed in Europe to treat the
symptoms of morning sickness caused birth defects in thousands
of babies. Since Kefauver-Harris, there have been very few
legislative developments in the United States.14
In Europe, there has also been no formal expansion of regulatory
legislation on evidence standards since the EMA’s inception in
1996. European regulatory standards, and in particular evidence
requirements for marketing approvals, largely parallel those of
the United States. Although there is no legal requirement to
provide comparative evidence, the EMA is increasingly
encouraging its submission. The EMA’s Committee for
Medicinal Products for Human Use recently stated it was in
favour of three arm non-inferiority trials including the
experimental drug, placebo, and active control when the use of
placebo is deemed ethical and one ormore establishedmedicines
are available.15 EMA also rewards manufacturers with an
extended (11 year) marketing protection period if they can
demonstrate that their product offers improved efficacy or safety
over existing treatments.
In both the United States and Europe, while submission of
comparative evidence is encouraged, regulatory agencies have
been reluctant to set comparative assessments as the default
evidence standard for market approval, although there have
been renewed calls to impose stricter regulation on latecomer
products that have questionable therapeutic value.
Health of pharmaceutical innovation
Many have suggested that the pharmaceutical industry as a
whole is suffering from a productivity crisis.17 Defining
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector remains controversial.
One commonly used metric by which to measure innovation is
the number of newmolecular entities entering the marketplace.13
The figure⇓ shows that by this definition of innovation, the rate
of pharmaceutical innovation is not declining. In fact, since the
1962 regulatory requirement in the United States for
manufacturers to establish evidence of safety and effectiveness,
there has been an increase in the number of new products
reaching the market. Furthermore, an analysis byMunos shows
that the rate of drug approvals has been constant over the past
60 years with an upward trend from 1980-95 (culminating in
53 approvals in 1996).16 The argument that regulation has
reduced pharmaceutical innovation is therefore unsubstantiated.
Although the number of new products reaching the market has
not decreased with existing regulation, manufacturers argue that
stricter market authorisation will lead to fewer new drug
approvals at increasingly higher cost.17 The cost of developing
new drugs has reportedly increased, as have total research and
development expenditures,18 while the number of new drugs
introduced to the market has increased moderately.19 However,
there are disagreements regarding the research and development
costs of a new drug,20 with some research finding oft stated
figures to be grossly overestimated.21 Total research and
development expenditures may include promotional spending
that is not directly tied to developing new products.22 Inflation
adjustment often does not properly account for changes in the
price of investment, and reported research and development
figures sometimes do not account for changes in prices.
Effects of requiring comparative evidence
Without historical evidence to suggest that regulation leads to
declines in innovation, what are the other potential outcomes
of introducing higher evidence standards? Requiring
comparative evidence at the time of market approval could have
a number of advantages. In the current regulatory environment,
relative benefits and harms of a new drug often emerge only
after market entry, which may be too late to adequately meet
the information needs of decision makers in clinical practice.
In addition, unlike regulatory agencies, payers need
manufacturers to provide comparative evidence to support
decisions for coverage and reimbursement. In some cases, this
discrepancy in evidence requirements results in conflicting
decisions by regulatory agencies and healthcare funders. For
example, health technology assessment agencies such as the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in
the United Kingdom, whichmakes decisions on value for money
on behalf of the National Health Service, require comparative
evidence to inform decisions on coverage and reimbursement.
A lack of relevant head to head trial data was one of the reasons
NICE cited for recommending against reimbursement of
bevacizumab, cetuximab, and panitumumab, which were
approved by the EMA for metastatic colorectal cancer. There
is a need to align the evidence needs of regulatory bodies,
country level payers, and health technology assessment
agencies.23
Requirements for comparative evidence at the time of market
approval could also encourage manufacturers to focus on
therapeutic areas with limited treatment options or where
comparators have poor efficacy or serious side effects, because
drugs in those areas would face fewer obstacles to authorisation.
There are indications that this is already
happening—manufacturers are increasingly evaluating their
portfolios to identify the products likely to face the greatest
scrutiny.24 These include product classes with numerous, similar
alternative therapies such as biological treatments for rheumatoid
arthritis and oral treatments for diabetes. Given that investment
in active-comparator trials varies tremendously across
therapeutic areas, standardising evidence requirements and
making comparative evidence the default option could shift
drug development towards areas where innovation has
historically been lacking.25
Nonetheless, there are legitimate concerns regarding changes
in evidence standards. Critically, judgments of efficacy are often
based on surrogate outcome measures, not clinical endpoints,
which can complicate the assessment of benefits and harms at
the time of market entry. Even if comparative evidence for
market approvals becomes the norm, the full effects of new
treatments approved on evidence from surrogate endpoints may
remain unknown until after marketing, as in the case for
rosiglitazone and pioglitazone in type 2 diabetes.
Requiring manufacturers to generate comparative evidence
could also lead to more costly and lengthy clinical trials,
particularly if superiority claims are sought and multiple
comparators are needed. To alleviate manufacturers’ concerns,
our proposal is to require evidence of similarity (equivalence
or non-inferiority at a minimum) for all conditions for which
an alternative treatment option exists. Given that only about
10% of newmedicines that reach themarket are deemed superior
to existing alternatives,26 requiring evidence of superiority could
limit the number of therapeutically viable alternatives for a
given condition and make it more difficult for clinicians to
individualise treatment options. Nevertheless, others have
proposed that for conditions with an existing generic treatment,
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Milestones in US legislation on market authorisation14
1906: Food and Drugs Act—prohibits interstate commerce in misbranded and adulterated drugs
1927: Regulatory functions pertaining to drugs are located under the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration (named Food and Drug
Administration in 1930)
1938: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act requires new drugs to be shown to be safe before marketing
1962: Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments—requires drug manufacturers to provide FDA with evidence of safety as well as effectiveness
of their products before marketing them
1966: Fair Packaging and Labeling Act—requires all consumer products in interstate commerce to be honestly and informatively labelled,
with FDA enforcing provisions on drugs and medical devices
1970: FDA requires the first patient package insert, mandating manufacturers to provide patients with information about specific risks
and benefits of drugs and devices
1976: Medical Device Amendments—requires manufacturers to register with FDA and follow quality control procedures to ensure safety
and effectiveness of medical devices and diagnostic products
1983: Orphan Drug Act—enables FDA to promote research and marketing of drugs needed for treating rare diseases
1988: Prescription Drug Marketing Act—bans the diversion of prescription drugs from legitimate commercial channels
1992: Prescription Drug User Fee Act—requires manufacturers to pay fees for product applications and other services
1997: Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act—reauthorises the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992. Provisions include
measures to accelerate review of devices, regulate advertising of unapproved uses of approved drugs and devices, and regulate health
claims for foods
manufacturers should demonstrate the superiority of the new
drug over the next best option in terms of either greater efficacy
or improved safety.27
Conclusions
A stricter regulatory environment for market access is likely to
be opposed by manufacturers, who will claim that patients will
suffer from fewer medicines reaching the market. However,
there is no evidence that increased regulation limits the number
of new drug approvals. Requiring comparative evidence at the
time of market entry would ensure that patients, clinicians, and
other healthcare decision makers such as payers and health
technology assessment bodies are adequately informed about
the relative merits of new treatments. Furthermore, changing
the nature of regulation and raising the evidence standards at
the time of licensing decisions could encourage manufacturers
to concentrate on the development of new drugs in therapeutic
areas with few or no alternatives. While formal regulation can
take years to develop, supplementing regulation with scientific
advice and guidance can steer manufacturers’ interest and efforts
into key research priorities and important technical issues.
Overall, the risks associated with making market entry stricter
seem to be relatively modest, particularly when compared with
the potential benefits.
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Figure
Fig 1 Number of new molecular entities approved in the United States, 1960-2010
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